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Expansion and amplification of weak randomness plays a crucial role in many security protocols.
Using quantum devices, such procedure is possible even without trusting the devices used, by utiliz-
ing correlations between outcomes of parts of the devices. We show here how to extract random bits
with an arbitrarily low bias from a single arbitrarily weak min-entropy source in a device indepen-
dent setting. To do this we use Mermin devices that exhibit super-classical correlations. Number of
devices used scales polynomially in the length of the random sequence n. Our protocol is robust, it
can tolerate devices that malfunction with a probability dropping polynomially in n at the cost of
a minor increase of the number of devices used.
High quality randomness is a very useful resource in
many computation and cryptographic tasks. In fact it
has been shown that many protocols (including quan-
tum ones) vitally require perfect randomness for their
security[1–3].
Unfortunately, at the same time perfect randomness is
very rare. In the classical world the true randomness,
i.e. independent uniformly distributed random bits, can-
not be produced at all. The only available resource is
pseudo-randomness, sequences that appear random to all
observers (often referred to as adversaries) not having full
information about the whole environment. Thus classical
randomness generators produce pseudorandom numbers
stemming from external sources and fluctuations, hoping
that the adversary will not be able to reconstruct all the
background information. Sources producing imperfect
randomness even taking into account the limited capa-
bilities of the adversary are called weak random sources.
To enhance the quality and security of these sources, ran-
domness extractors are used. These are devices that com-
bine more sources of randomness to obtain fewer bits of
higher quality [4].
On the other hand, theoretically the production of true
randomness is possible, if one assumes Quantum theory
to be valid: Preparation of a pure state and measurement
in its complementary basis will yield a perfectly random
result. This is due to the inherent randomness present in
Quantum theory itself - this principle is being used in the
design commercially available devices [5]. The assump-
tion, however, is high quality and stability of quantum
devices in an adversarial setting, which is far from trivial
to achieve [6].
In addition, quantum devices in reality act more like
black boxes that are inaccessible for users except for pro-
viding them classical inputs and obtaining classical out-
puts from them. It is very hard, if not impossible, to di-
rectly test what these devices actually do, whether they
perform operations and measurements as promised and
whether their outputs really come from quantum mea-
surements. Therefor it is crucial to test these devices
even during their activity - satisfying these tests shall
guarantee that the devices are correctly designed and
manufactured and they work as desired. This is possible
by utilizing super-classical correlations of certain quan-
tum states - if the device consists from separate parts,
their classical results can be tested for correlations and
their level, if breaking the classical bound, can be a guar-
antee of their quantum nature. Using non-trusted (or
self-testing) quantum devices is referred as Device inde-
pendence in a broader scope. The process of transforma-
tion of a weak random source into uniformly random bits
is called randomness extraction throughout this letter.
Weak random sources – To provide a figure of merit
of randomness extractors, one needs to characterize the
randomness of the input random source. One of the pos-
sible parameterizations is the so called Santha–Vazirani
(SV) parametrization [7], given by the following prop-
erty: Let X = (X1, X2, . . . ) be an arbitrarily long ran-
dom bit string produced by an ε-SV source. Then for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ n it holds that
∀x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ {0, 1},∀e ∈ I(E), (1)∣∣∣∣P (Xi = 0|Xi−1 = xi−1, . . . , X1 = x1, E = e)− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
where E is any information an adversary Eve might hold.
Note here that the apparent randomness (i.e. without
knowledge of E) of each Xi may as well be uniform. The
purpose of introducing random variable E is to repre-
sent possible correlations between the choice of the mea-
surement settings and internal workings of the devices
running a Bell type test.
Second possibility is to consider a one-shot use source
that would produce n-bit strings X (with n being arbi-
trary large). Here we can characterize the randomness of
the source by the (conditional) min-entropy of the pro-
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2duced sequence defined as
H∞(X|E) = − log2 max
x∈I(X),e∈I(E)
P (X = x|E = e).
A source is called an (n, k) source if H∞(X|E) ≥ k and
might be also characterized by its min-entropy rate R =
k/n.
Combining these two approaches we get the reusable
min-entropy source with n-bit blocks of output with guar-
anteed min-entropy k. Such a source can be modeled as
a sequence of n-bit random variables X1, X2, . . . , such
that
∀x1, . . . , xi−1 ∈ {0, 1}n,∀e ∈ I(E), (2)
H∞(Xi|Xi−1 = xi−1, . . . , X1 = x1, E = e) ≥ k.
Therefore, each new block has a guaranteed minimal min-
entropy, even conditioned on the previous ones and any
information of the adversary. It is easy to see that SV
sources are recovered with n = 1 and ε = 2−H∞(X) − 12 .
Source of this type is also called block source.
Classically the task of transforming a single weak
source, characterized either as a Santha-Vazirani source,
or a min-entropy (block) source into a fully random bit
is known to be impossible [4, 7]. However, with non-
classical resources the task becomes possible. More pre-
cisely, weak random source can be used to choose mea-
surements for a Bell test in order to certify that observed
correlations cannot be explained by local theories and
thus must necessarily contain intrinsic randomness.
In their seminal paper Colbeck and Renner [8] showed
that amplification of Santha-Vazirani sources is possi-
ble for a certain range of parameter ε and thus opened
a line of research devoted to SV amplification. Sub-
sequent works provided protocols that are able to am-
plify SV-sources for any ε < 12 in various settings [9–
12]. This line of researched culminated in the work of
Branda˜o et. al. [13], who showed how to amplify such
source of randomness with the use of only eight non-
communicating devices. Their work was quickly followed
by that of Coudron and Yuan [14], who showed how to
use 20 non-communicating devices to obtain arbitrary
many bits from a Santha-Vazirani source.
On the other hand, extraction from min–entropy
sources is relatively unexplored. There is a sequence
of works exploring the validity of Bell tests if the mea-
surements are chosen according to a min–entropy source
[15, 16] and the authors of this paper provided a proto-
col which uses 3-party GHZ-paradox to amplify sources
with min-entropy rate R > 14 log2(10) against quantum
adversaries [17]. Recently an extensive work on this topic
was made public on pre-print archive [18]. In this letter
we conclude this work by providing a protocol extract-
ing random bits from min-entropy sources of randomness
with any non-zero min–entropy rate.
Device-independent concept and Mermin inequality –
In this letter we use the three partite Mermin inequal-
ity. Let’s consider three spatially-separated boxes, each
of them having a single bit input and a single bit out-
put. Let us denote the input bits of the respective boxes
by X, Y and Z and the corresponding output bits A, B
and C. By construction we guarantee X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z = 1,
i.e. we consider only inputs XY Z ∈ {111, 100, 010, 001}
simultaneously passed to all boxes. The value v of the
Mermin term is a function of the 4 conditional probabil-
ities defined by the behaviour of the device and of the
probability distribution p on inputs
v =P (A⊕B ⊕ C = 1|XY Z = 111)P (XY Z = 111)+
+P (A⊕B ⊕ C = 0|XY Z = 100)P (XY Z = 100)+
+P (A⊕B ⊕ C = 0|XY Z = 010)P (XY Z = 010)+
+P (A⊕B ⊕ C = 0|XY Z = 001)P (XY Z = 001).
(3)
In particular, for the uniform input distribution we set
P (XY Z = 111) = P (XY Z = 010) = P (XY Z = 001) =
P (XY Z = 100) = 14 and denote the Mermin term by vu.
Assuming the uniform distribution on all four inputs,
the maximal value of vu achievable by a classical device
[19] is 34 (thus the Mermin inequality reads vu ≤ 34 ) and
there exists a classical device that can make any 3 con-
ditional probabilities simultaneously equal to 1. In the
quantum world we can achieve vu = 1 and satisfy per-
fectly all 4 conditional probabilities using the tripartite
GHZ state 1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉) and measuring σX (σY )
when receiving 0 (1) on input.
The beautiful property of the Mermin inequality is that
the violation v gives us directly the probability that the
device passes a specific test A⊕B ⊕C = X · Y · Z. The
probability of failing the test reads w = 1− v.
Mironowicz, Gallego and Pawlowski (MGP) [10]
showed the following result: Take a linearly ordered se-
quence of k Mermin devices D1...Dk (k being arbitrary)
that have uniform distribution on inputs, and each device
knows inputs and outputs of its predecessors (for optional
cheating purposes), but devices cannot signal to its pre-
decessors. Let us assume that the inputs of devices are
described by random variables XY Z1, . . . , XY Zk, and
the outputs by ABC1, . . . , ABCk. Then there exists a
function f(ε) such that if the value of the Mermin vari-
able (3) using uniform inputs is at least vu ≥ f(ε), then
the output bit Ak has a bias at most ε conditioned on
the input and output of all its predecessors and the ad-
versarial knowledge. This function can be lower bounded
by a Semi-Definite Program (SDP) using any level of the
hierarchy introduced in [20]. By using the second level
of the hierarchy one can obtain the bound on f(ε) as a
function of ε shown in Fig.1. We can set k = 1 (hav-
ing just a single device) and get the lower bound on the
detection probability of producing a bit biased by more
than ε, which is wu > 1 − f(ε). More independent non-
communicating devices can be ordered into any sequence
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FIG. 1. Depicted is the value of Mermin variable v = f(ε)
needed to certify the bias of the output bit to be at most ε.
and thus this limit holds for any of these devices simul-
taneously.
Single-round protocol – In the rest of our analysis we
will be working with (n, k) sources for an arbitrary n and
k ≥ 2. This is to simplify the explanation, since by taking
d 2k′ e blocks of an arbitrary (n′, k′) source with k′ > 0 we
get a (n, k) source with n = d 2k′ en′ and k = d 2k′ ek′ ≥ 2.
Let us start with a min-entropy (n, 2) source (recall
that (n, k) source with k > 2 is also an (n, 2) source) and
define N = 2n. Let H = {h1, . . . , hm} be a family of
hash functions s.t. hi : {0, ..., N − 1} → {0, 1, 2, 3}. Each
hash-function hi is used to provide input for a Mermin-
type device Di, where outputs of the function 0, 1, 2, 3
identify 111, 100, 010, 001 inputs for the device.
We want to construct H with the property that for ev-
ery 4-element set S ⊆ {0, . . . , N − 1} there exist at least
one hash function h ∈ H such that h(S) = {0, 1, 2, 3}.
This is trivially satisfied for the set of all possible hashing
functions Hfull = {0, 1, 2, 3}N , however, such a class of
functions with its 4N elements is unpractically large. In
the supplementary material we show a construction with
logarithmic number of functions in N , thus the number
of devices needed scales polynomially with the length of
the sequence n. We also stress that for large n one hash
function covers as many as 9% of all four-tuples, inde-
pendently on n. So the size of an optimal set of hash
functions might not depend on n at all.
The protocol works as follows:
1. We obtain the (weakly) random n bit string X from
the random number generator.
2. Into each device Di we input the 3 bit string hi(X)
– inputs Xi, Yi and Zi and obtain the outputs Ai,
Bi and Ci.
3. We verify whether for each device Di the condition
Zi⊕ Yi⊕Zi = Ai ·Bi ·Ci holds. If this is not true,
we abort the protocol due to cheating attempt of
the provider.
4. We define the output bit of the protocol as b =⊕m
i=1Ai.
The protocol is depicted in the Fig. 2.
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FIG. 2. Depiction of a single round protocol. Bit string drawn
from the flat random source is hashed into m inputs into Mer-
min devices so that at least one device receives perfectly ran-
dom distribution. This guarantees at least one result almost
perfectly random, what also holds for the product of individ-
ual results.
Let us now examine the properties of the bit b. First
consider only flat (n, 2) distributions. Recall that these
are exactly distributions that are uniform on 4-element
subsets of the sample space. Our construction of the class
H of hash functions assures that for any flat probability
distribution there is a function hj ∈ H and the corre-
sponding device Dj such that inputs of Dj (hashed by
hj) are uniform on this flat distribution. This gives us
that if adversary restricts himself to flat distributions and
wants to achieve bias greater than ε for the output bit b,
she must achieve this bias in all rounds. The probability
that she is not detected while doing this is vu ≤ f(ε) for
each round. The same condition holds then also for the
product of all output bits b.
The set of all (n, 2) distributions is convex and flat dis-
tributions are exactly all extremal points of this convex
set. Thus any (n, 2) distribution d can be expressed as a
convex combination of at most N (n, 2) flat distributions
di (Caratheodory theorem) as d =
∑N
i=1 pidi for some
pi ≥ 0,
∑N
i=1 pi = 1. The probability that the adversary
is not detected is given by the successful cheating proba-
4bilities when using flat distribution di ∈ {di}Ni=1 averaged
thourgh the probability distribution on these flat distri-
butions vu ≤
∑N
i=1 piP (not detected|di) ≤ f(ε)
∑N
i=1 pi
[21]. Thus the upper bound vu ≤ f(ε) holds for non-flat
distributions as well.
To summarize this part, having an (n, k) source with
k ≥ 2, with a single round of a protocol, we can produce
a single bit that is biased at most by ε with a certainty
of 1− f(ε).
Multiple-round protocol for block sources – Let us state
the most general task: we have an (n, k) block source
with arbitrary n and k ≥ 2 (recall that any source with
k > 0 can be multiplied to obtain k ≥ 2). We would like
to produce a bit that is biased by no more than ε with
certainty of at least 1− δ.
If the one-round version does not meet these parame-
ters, we will repeat the whole protocol l times. By using
new devices and new outputs of the block source, each
of the runs j will produce a bit bj , that is biased by ε
from perfectly random bit conditioned on all the previ-
ous bits up to a probability f(ε). Thus also the XOR
of all output bits b =
l⊕
j=1
bj will have at most the bias ε.
After l rounds, the probability of the adversary not being
detected will be upper bounded by f(ε)l. Note that the
product form does not come from the fact that the detec-
tion probabilities are independent (they are not). This is
a product of a chain of conditional probabilities. Recall
that the bound f(ε) holds conditioned by any inputs and
outputs of the previous devices (in an arbitrarily ordering
that respects the causality). Thus choosing l > log δlog f(ε)
will guarantee the fulfillment of the conditions for the
parameters ε and δ.
Summing up, with an (n, k) block source and
O
(
log δ
log f(ε)Poly
[
n
⌈
2
k
⌉])
Mermin devices we can produce
a single random bit with bias smaller than ε with prob-
ability largen than 1 − δ. For producing more bits we
simply repeat the whole procedure: all the bits produced
will have bias smaller than ε conditioned on the bits pro-
duced so far, with linearly scaling of resources.
Protocol for one-shot min-entropy sources – We can
model a different scenario where the random source is
described by a single use min-entropy source character-
ized by its min-entropy rate R. In such a case we cannot
use the same scenario as before, as there are no indepen-
dent blocks of randomness with guaranteed min-entropy
available. In spite of this fact randomness extraction is
still possible on the cost of increasing the number of de-
vices used.
We can draw a bit string from the source with length n
and min-entropy Rn, securing at least 2Rn realizations of
the string appearing with non-zero probability. We shall
use this string for a single round of the protocol, however
using a full set of hashing functions Hfull. Then, for
flat sources, there will be at least Rn2 devices obtaining
perfectly random distribution on inputs independently
on each other (see supplementary material for explicit
construction), yielding failure probability of the protocol
δ < f(ε)
Rn
2 . Thus choosing n > 2R
log(δ)
log(f(ε)) will produce a
random bit biased by no more than ε up to a probability
δ, though on the costs of double-exponential number of
devices in 1R and
log(δ)
log f(ε) . For non-flat sources the same
result holds due to Caratheodory theorem mentioned ear-
lier.
Robustness – Aborting the protocol after even a single
mistake of the devices is certainly highly impractical from
the imlementation point of view. Therefor we expand our
analysis into a situation where we tolerate certain noise
on the devices, which would manifest itself by occasional
failing of the test condition even for honest devices. More
specifically, we shall tolerate a certain fraction of the de-
vices to malfunction without aborting the protocol.
In the supplementary material we show that we can
tolerate up to l (1−f(ε))2 devices to fail in the whole pro-
tocol and still achieve the same result as for the perfect
protocol by choosing l > 8 ln δf(ε)−1 . This translates into in-
creasing the number of rounds of the protocol comparing
to the case of ideal devices by a factor of 8 ln(f(ε))f(ε)−1 . For
small ε the parameter f(ε) approaches 1 and the multi-
plication factor saturates by 8. For honest devices with
individual failure probability bounded by (1−f(ε))4m , the
probability of a false alarm decreases exponentially with
the number of protocol rounds l.
Conclusion – In this letter we have introduced a proto-
col that extracts weak randomness obtained from a min-
entropy source in the device independent setting. The
protocol works for arbitrarily weak both single-use and
block min-entropy sources, with a reasonable scaling of
the number of devices in the latter case. Our protocol is
also robust, as it allows tolerating some fraction of mal-
functioning devices at the cost of a constant increase of
the number of devices used.
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Construction of the class H
Let H = {h1, . . . , hm} be a family of hash functions
s.t. hi : {0, ..., N − 1} → {0, 1, 2, 3}. Let us assume
that we receive an element of {0, . . . , N − 1} drawn ran-
domly according some (non-uniform) distribution with
min-entropy log2 k (we consider only k ≥ 4).
We want to construct H with the property that for ev-
ery set S ⊆ {0, . . . , N − 1} with |S| ≥ k there is at least
one hash function h ∈ H such that h(S) = {0, 1, 2, 3}.
This is trivially satisfied for Hfull = {0, 1, 2, 3}N , how-
ever, such a class of functions is unpractically large, it
has 4N elements. Therefor we shall construct a smaller
set fulfilling the condition.
Derandomization construction of the class H
Let us consider a sequence of random variables Z =
(Z0, . . . , ZN−1) such that Zi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The outcomes
of such a random experiment are N -position sequences
from the set {0, 1, 2, 3}N . It is easy to see that each
such sequence specifies uniquely a particular function h :
{0, ..., N −1} → {0, 1, 2, 3}, and vice versa. Since now on
we will use them interchangeably.
Let us assume that random variables Z satisfy the con-
dition that for every 4–tuple of positions j0, j1, j2, j3 and
every 4-element string a0a1a2a3 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}4 it holds
that
P
[
Zj0 = a0 ∧ Zj1 = a1 ∧ Zj2 = a2 ∧ Zj3 = a3
]
> 0. (4)
Note that for our purposes even a weaker assumption on
Z is sufficient: It is enough if for every 4–tuple of posi-
tions j0, j1, j2, j3 there exists at least one 4-element string
a0a1a2a3 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}4 with all a0, a1, a2, a3 begin mutu-
ally different and satisfying (4). However, the stronger
condition will make it easier to find a suitable set.
Let us denote H = {a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}N s.t. P [Z = a] >
0}. Using the probabilistic method we see, that for
each 4–tuple of positions j0, j1, j2, j3 and every 4-element
string a0a1a2a3 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}4 there exists a function
h ∈ H such that
h(j0) = a0 ∧ h(j1) = a1 ∧ h(j2) = a2 ∧ h(j3) = a3.
The number of functions in H is the same as the number
of (nonzero probability) sample space elements of Z. It
remains to construct Z with a sample space as small as
possible.
Construction of a random variable Z
Definition .1 We define the distance of two distribu-
tions D1 and D2 by
||D1 −D2|| =
∑
ω∈Ω
|D1(ω)−D2(ω)| ,
where Ω is the set of all possible events.
Definition .2 Binary random variables are k-wise δ-
dependent iff for all subsets S ⊆ {0, . . . , N −1}, |S| ≤ k
||U(S)−D(S)|| ≤ δ,
6where U(S) is a uniform distribution over |S|-bit strings
and D(S) is a marginal distribution over subset of vari-
ables specified by S.
Theorem .3 The logarithm of the cardinality of the
sample space needed for constructing N k-wise δ-
dependent random variables is O
(
k + log logN + log 1δ
)
[22].
Let us consider two sequences X0, . . . , XN−1 and
Y0, . . . , YN−1 of binary 4-wise δ–dependent random vari-
ables, both sequences being mutually independent. Let
Zi = 2Xi + Yi.
As both X and Y are δ-dependent, their distance from
the uniform distribution on every subset of size at most
4 is at most δ. Assuming there is a zero probability
for at least one binary string out of {0, 1}4 at positions
(0, 1, 2, 3) we have that the distance of such a distribution
from the uniform distribution is at least 2× 2−4 = 2−3.
Hence, assuring that δ < 2−3 we obtain that for each
4 positions there is a nonzero probability of every 4-bit
sequence appearing. Hence, for the sequence of random
variables Z it holds that every 4-tuple of positions every
string out of {0, 1, 2, 3}4 appears with non-zero probabil-
ity.
In our case we need two independent sets of N = 2n
4-wise 1/8-dependent random variables, resulting in a
sample space of O(nc), bearing the desired polynomial
construction.
Robustness
Let us assume we would tolerate a failure at most
(1−f(ε))
2 l devices during the run of the whole protocol.
Let us first calculate the number of rounds of the proto-
col l needed to obtain the original ε and δ characteristics
of the non-robust device.
Efficiency
Assuming the adversary is cheating (wants to achieve
bias greater than ε), in each round of the protocol there
will be at least one device failure with probability 1−f(ε).
The probability δ that the adversary stays undetected
while all devices produce bias at least ε is bounded by
the distribution function of the binomial distribution
δ ≤ F
(
(1− f(ε))
2
l; l; 1− f(ε)
)
.
This probability can be upper bounded by Chernoff’s
inequality by
F
(
(1− f(ε))
2
l; l; 1− f(ε)
)
≤ e− (1−f(ε))8 l. (5)
We can derive the necessary number of rounds of the
protocol l to be
l > 8
ln δ
f(ε)− 1 .
Comparing to the number of rounds needed for the non-
robust protocol log δlog f(ε) we can obtain the scaling factor
s to be
s = 8
ln f(ε)
f(ε)− 1 .
For f(ε) → 1 (what is the case for small ε) the scaling
factor approaches a constant of 8.
Imperfectness
We also want to assure there exist a non-zero failing
probability of each individual device µ such that the pro-
tocol execution will not be (falsely) declared to be at-
tacked by the adversary with high probability. Let us
consider an honest provider (not trying to cheat) and set
µ = 1−f(ε)4m . We will calculate the probability that more
than (1−f(ε))2 l devices will fail during the process.
Since the producer of the devices is assumed to be hon-
est (otherwise the protocol failure is justified), we may
assume that failures of devices are independent of each
other. Therefore the failures can be modeled by i.i.d.
Bernoulli random variables (Zi = 1 if the i–th device fails
the test) Z1, . . . , Zml, with P (Zi = 1) = µ =
1−f(ε)
4m ).
The number of failures Z =
∑ml
i=1 Zi is binomially dis-
tributed. For the protocol not to abort we need less than
1−f()
2 l failures, hence we need to upper bound the prob-
ability
P
(
ml∑
i=1
Zi >
1− f()
2
l
)
= F
(
ml − l1− f()
2
,ml, 1− µ
)
.
We can use the Hoeffding inequality:
P
(
ml∑
i=1
Zi >
1− f()
2
l
)
≤ e− (1−f(ε))
2
8m l,
i.e. the probability of false protocol abort drops expo-
nentially with the number of rounds l.
Using Hfull for Non-Block Sources
We used the following claim in the main text: If we
hash the outcome of a (n,Rn)-flat distribution by each of
the hash functions from the full set of functions Hfull =
{hi : {0, 1}n 7→ {0, 1, 2, 3}}, at least Rn2 functions have
uniform and independent outcomes.
7First let us suppose Rn is natural and even. Then
there are 4Rn/2 strings appearing with probability 1
4Rn/2
.
Let us label them {si}(4
Rn/2−1)
i=0 . We will now explicitly
construct hash functions {hj}Rn/2j=0 with desired proper-
ties.
Let M be Rn2 times 4
Rn/2 matrix with ith column being
a representation of i in base 4. Let us assign hj(si) = Mji
(example with Rn = 4 is depicted in Fig. (3)). Al-
though this is only a partial definition of {hj}Rn/2j=0 , it is
sufficient for our purposes, because other strings appear
with probability 0. It should now be straightforward to
see that each vector of outcomes (h0, . . . , hRn/2) appears
with equal probability and therefore marginal distribu-
tions of outputs of a single function h is uniform and
independent on the others.
s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s8 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14 s15
h0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
h1 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
FIG. 3. Matrix M for Rn = 4.
By Caratheodory theorem all other values of Rn can
be written as convex combinations of (n,m) flat sources
with m = 2bRn/2c, which gives us that the probability
to cheat with such (n,Rn) source is at most the same
as with (n,m) flat source – i. e. equal to bRn2 c boxes
obtaining uniform independent inputs.
